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SYMPOSIUM: INDIAN PROPERTY RIGHTS
SYMPOSIUM FOREWORD:
INDIAN NATIONS AND THE LAW
Joseph William Singer*
[The Indians Y right of occupancy is considered as sacred as the fee simple of the whites.
Justice Henry Baldwin1
The United States has always been of two minds about Indian property. On one
hand, it has almost never seen Indian lands that it did not covet; on the other hand, the
reigning ideology suggested that property rights should be respected. This means that
the country sought to acquire Indian lands, but tried to do so in a way that appeared to
respect the rights of Indian nations as property owners. From the beginning, the United
States Supreme Court has similarly swung wildly back and forth from asserting the
sacred rights of property--even when held by Indian nations-and justifying conquest.
The Court professes doctrines that grant legal protection to tribal property and
sovereignty, yet, time and again, it has shown itself willing to sacrifice principles, ignore
precedent, and silently overrule cases without even mentioning them, while establishing
rules that govern Indian property and sovereignty that are nothing short of
discriminatory.
The 2004-2005 term of the Supreme Court has been no different. Many authors of
this symposium felt compelled to respond to the Supreme Court's recent ruling in City of
Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York 2 and for good reason. As Sarah Krakoff
describes so poignantly in her article, 3 the Supreme Court's recent decision in City of
Sherrill ignores canons of interpretation that the Court itself has adopted to govern treaty
interpretation, reservation diminishment, and state taxation of Indian nations.4 To add
* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Thanks and affection go to Martha Minow. © 2005 Joseph
William Singer.
1. Mitchel v. US., 34 U.S. 711,746 (1835).
2. 125 S. Ct. 1478 (2005). 1 have also written elsewhere criticizing the reasoning in the case. Joseph
William Singer, Nine-Tenths of the Law: Title, Possession, & Sacred Obligations, 38 Conn. L. Rev. __
(forthcoming 2006).
3. Sarah Krakoff, City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York: A Regretful Postscript to the
Taxation Chapter in Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 41 Tulsa L. Rev. 5 (2005).
4. See id. at 9-10. Kristen Carpenter similarly criticizes the reasoning in City of Sherrill. See Kristen A.
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insult to injury, it blames the Oneida Indian Nation for losing its land to the state of New
York. despite the fact that the Oneida Nation did all that could have been expected of it
in the face of overwhelming odds.5 Moreover, Krakoff argues that City of Sherrill
conceivably opens Indian claims to broad equitable defenses that allow the "increasing
weight of history" 6 to undermine tribal sovereignty just as Indian nations are
strengthening their governmental institutions and revitalizing that very sovereignty.
7
Wenona Singel and Matthew Fletcher similarly explore the meaning of City of
Sherrill in their article. 8 They focus on the Supreme Court's use of the doctrine of
laches to bar Indian land claims. Because laches is an equitable doctrine created by the
chancery courts to promote justice and morality, the historical context in which Indian
nations lost their land is relevant to current day decisions on the applicability of doctrines
whose effect is to deny those claims. Singel and Fletcher explain in detail the unjust
circumstances in which tribal lands were taken by non-Indians and by the United States,
often through raw power unsanctioned by legal authority. 9 After such exercises of raw
power, the courts would often bless those acts after the fact by bending applicable law to
authorize what were plainly unlawful land grabs.' 0 They conclude by explaining that the
laches doctrine co-exists with other equally applicable equitable principles such as the
clean hands doctrine that could easily justify not applying laches to bar these claims." 1
In her article, Anne Zimmermann explains the complicated and inconsistent rules
of jurisdiction relating to state taxation in Indian country. 12 The law in this area starts
from the premise that Indian nations and Indians who live and work in Indian country are
exempt from state taxation, as is Indian property held in trust or located within
reservation borders. 13 However, Zimmermann notes the myriad of ways in which the
Supreme Court has authorized state incursions on tribal sovereignty by allowing state
taxation of tribal activity on Indian lands when it involves commercial sales to
non-Indians. 14 She further notes that the Supreme Court's rulings in County of Yakima
v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Nation15 and Cass County v. Leech
Lake Band of Chippewa Indians16 have the potential to result in the loss of a substantial
Carpenter, Recovering Homelands, Governance, and Lifeways: A Book Review of Blood Struggle: The Rise of
Modem Indian Nations, 41 Tulsa L. Rev. 79 (2005).
5. See Krakoff, supra n. 3 at 14-17. For another critique of City of Sherrill along similar lines, see Singer,
supra n. 2.
6. See State v. Elliott, 616 A.2d 210, 218 (Vt. 1992). See Joseph William Singer, Well Settled?: The
Increasing Weight of History in American Indian Land Claims, 28 Ga. L. Rev. 481 (1994) (criticizing
Vermont's ruling in Elliott).
7. See Krakoff, supra n. 3 at 10-11, 18-19.
8. Wenona T. Singel & Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Power, Authority, and Tribal Property, 41 Tulsa L.
Rev. 21 (2005).
9. See id
10. See id. at pt. V.
11. See id at 128-29.
12. Anne Zimmermann, Student Author, Taxation of Indians: An Analysis and Comparison of New Mexico
and Oklahoma State Tax Laws, 41 Tulsa L. Rev. 91 (2005).
13. See id. at 92.
14. See Zimmermann, supra n. 12.
15. 502 U.S. 251 (1992).
16. 524 U.S. 103 (1998).
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amount of tribal land through state tax foreclosures. 17 She also compares how well New
Mexico and Oklahoma have done in amending their state statutes to accord with
Supreme Court rulings on the allowable extent of state taxing authority in Indian
country.1
8
When the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Kelo v. City of New London, 19 much
of the country erupted with outrage at the idea of taking property from one person for the
purpose of transferring it to others in the name of the public good. Many argued that this
had not been done historically in the United States and found the practice abhorrent.
Putting aside the fact that, perhaps unbeknownst to many, it has been relatively common
to take property from some owners and transfer it to others for urban redevelopment
purposes, Stacy Leeds explains in her article what was painfully obvious to anyone
who pays attention to Indian property issues, i.e., that government takings of property
from some to transfer to others was standard government policy throughout the
nineteenth century; it was, after all, the way the United States obtained tribal title for the
purpose of transferring it to non-Indian owners.2 1 Such ideas even persisted to the
twentieth century and even the present day, as the City of Sherrill decision shows. Leeds
goes on to consider the wisdom of tribal government use of the eminent domain power.
22
She notes that although this might not have been something the Cherokee Nation
government would ever have historically contemplated doing, it is a powerful and useful
tool of sovereign power that tribal governments should consider employing in
appropriate cases to address otherwise intractable issues arising from fractionated
ownership.
23
What these articles have in common is a sense of frustration with the willingness
of the Supreme Court to bend the rules to protect the interests of non-Indians, while
failing to apply clearly applicable rules of law that were enacted by Congress and agreed
to by the United States in solemn treaties to protect the interests of Indian nations. In an
era when many people support a "restrained" judiciary willing to defer to Congress on
the basis of "strict construction" of both statutes and constitutional text, it is frustrating to
find a Supreme Court that supposedly adheres to that philosophy, yet is so willing to
ignore precedent and the text of the United States Constitution, federal treaties, and
statutes in the interest of providing equitable treatment to non-Indian interests, while
showing a fundamental misunderstanding of both the history of the United States'
relations with Indian nations and the basic principles of federal Indian law. After all, it is
not as if Congress and the non-Indian public are without remedy if the Supreme Court
were to act to protect tribal property rights with as much vigor as it protects the property
rights of non-Indians; yet, the Supreme Court consistently fails to accord Indian nations
17. See Zimmermann, supra n. 12, at 113-16.
18. Seeid. atpts. III-IV.
19. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
20. Stacy L. Leeds, By Eminent Domain or Some Other Name: A Tribal Perspective on Taking
Land, 41 Tulsa L. Rev. 51 (2005).
21. See id.
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the same protections it grants non-Indian owners and non-Indian sovereigns. 24  The
Supreme Court has interpreted the U.S. Constitution to give Congress "plenary power"
over Indian affairs, giving Congress ample power to pass legislation to protect the
legitimate interests of non-Indians. And despite Congress's attempt to outlaw treaty
making between the United States and Indian nations, nothing prevents the United States
from negotiating with Indian nations to reach agreements that settle whatever differences
exist.
The Supreme Court's eagerness to step into the fray to protect the interests of
non-Indians is insulting in another way: it assumes that non-Indians would be subject to
oppressive and unjust treatment if they were subject to tribal authority. The evidence
actually points the other way. Because of the plenary power doctrine, Indian nations
have extraordinary incentives to be fair to non-Indians whose interests are affected by
their sovereign acts. If the last twenty years of Supreme Court rulings are any guide,
Indian nations cannot expect to have their rights protected by the Supreme Court. This is
a case of the pot calling the kettle black.
How are we to get through such times when the Court fails to protect Indian
nations from loss of their rights? One antidote is to recognize what Indian nations have
accomplished and continue to accomplish. Kristen Carpenter's review of Charles
Wilkinson's new book 25 reminds us through poignant stories and historical details the
extraordinary accomplishments of Indian nations in revitalizing tribal sovereignty since
the dark days of termination. Their tenacity, ingenuity, creativity, and strength
demonstrate again and again that, even as they deal with grave problems, Indian nations
will continue to thrive through adverse Supreme Court rulings. After all, if they survived
removal, allotment, and termination, they can survive anything, even a Supreme Court
that does not understand them.
24. I have written on this theme for a long time. See Joseph William Singer, Canons of Conquest: The
Supreme Court's Attack on Tribal Sovereignty, 37 New Eng. L. Rev. 641, 667-68 (2003); Joseph William
Singer, Lone Wolf or How to Take Property By Calling It a "Mere Change in the Form of Investment, " 38
Tulsa L. Rev. 37 (2002); Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1 (1991).
25. Carpenter, supra n. 4 (reviewing Charles Wilkinson, Blood Struggle: The Rise of Modern Indian
Nations (W.W. Norton & Co. 2005)).
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